by Pavel Andreev, Head of RIA Novosti International Projects and political commentator
The zero hour of the first fully-fledged Russia- U.S. summit nears. The pressure of positive expectations is mounting on the two presidents, who have dared to take up the task of dragging the two countries out of the epic brawl and lead them to a bright future of strategic partnership. Their agenda is limitless; however, of those many areas where the interests of Russia and the U.S. overlap, there are very few where the objectives themselves coincide.
Indeed, stabilizing the so called Southern Front – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq is important for both. Drug trafficking, export of extremism and nuclear proliferation additionally prove to be weighty issues. Yet – while it is the U.S. and its NATO allies’ troops, who are stuck in Afghanistan – Russia’s assistance in transporting supplies over its own territory is almost taken for granted, while its influence in the region – even though it is said to be seen as veritably positive and cooperative is being curbed.
The question over unstable Iran on the verge of creating a nuclear weapon also remains a great concern for both countries. Yet Russia’s economic interests are potentially closer to Moscow’s heart, more so than toppling Ahmadinejad; the U.S. economic and political interests require the opposite.
Surely, the agenda of overcoming the economic crisis is of mutual interest. Yet Moscow and Washington envisage the future architecture of the world financial system in dramatically different ways.
Furthermore, whereas security of energy supplies is advantageous for both sides, both of them want to have it under exclusive control.
The Pan-European security arrangement, which would include the U.S. and Russia, will benefit not only the two parties, but also their allies and partners in Europe. However, it is still hard to see Washington abandoning the current NATO-centered structure for an agreement that would merge it with Russia and its CIS organizations.
The focal point of the “reset” surge in the run-up to the summit, namely, strategic arms reduction, appears to be an area where the awaiting breakthrough may happen due to their coinciding interests on the issue. Yet their interests do not in fact correspond. For Russia, a dramatic reduction in its nuclear firepower without a legally binding ABM ban – as it was before the United States walked out of the 1972 Treaty in 2001 – or a legally binding obligation of joint operation of the system is in fact quite a dangerous venture.
In an area of vital importance to Russia – its “Near Abroad” – Russia-U.S. interests are next to conflicting. Washington has never officially abandoned the idea of NATO expansion into Ukraine and Georgia, which is considered by Moscow as threatening its national security. Meanwhile, the stimuli to anti-Russian political forces in the Commonwealth of independent States (CIS) countries continue.
Having said that, a strategic partnership between Russia and the United States will be of benefit to both countries. There is huge potential in the economic sphere, with particular focus on joint development of energy resources, nuclear energy cooperation. Politically both countries will gain “weight” in the face of the rising Chinese giant, once they forge their positive partnership. On top of that, joint efforts are required on North Korea and the Middle East.
However, the complexion of the picture makes it impossible for a step-by-step resolution to satisfy both sides. The U.S. seems to understand this. Thus, a new START agenda, which, it should be said, once resolved, would leave Moscow one joker fewer in its thin deck.
Moscow requires a comprehensive review of its national interests; a positive approach has to be preferred over a reactionary one. Concrete proposals based on crucial issues need to be put on the table. European security has to be one of them. The deal has to incorporate the difficult issues of NATO expansion, relating aspects of ABM and START, as well as cooperation on counterterrorism and the Southern Front. U.S. support for energy initiatives, suggested by President Medvedev, also has to be sought. Those might have to be dealt together with the issues of development for peaceful use of nuclear power, development of the resources in the Arctic and clearing the status of transit countries, which destabilize Russia’s relations with the Near Abroad.
This set of proposals would compel Washington to reveal whether it is truly prepared for a reset, or whether it wants Russia to rethink its national interests. It will also allow the two countries to find the missing common values – internationally, if not domestically. There is no need to rush with signing the deals. It might complicate PR efforts. But taking things together will help us to digest the whole complexity of the current situation, rather than taking the easy parts out and leaving the bad stuff spoiling the prospect of partnership.
